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THE EXTENDED CORPORATE MIND:
WHEN CORPORATIONS USE AI TO BREAK THE
LAW*
MIHAILIS E. DIAMANTIS**
Algorithms may soon replace employees as the leading cause of corporate
misconduct. For centuries, the law has defined corporate misconduct—anything
from civil discrimination to criminal insider trading—in terms of employee
misconduct. Today, however, breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and big
data allow automated systems to make many corporate decisions, e.g., who gets
a loan or what stocks to buy. These technologies introduce valuable efficiencies,
but they do not remove (or even always reduce) the incidence of corporate harm.
Unless the law adapts, corporations will become increasingly immune to civil
and criminal liability as they transfer responsibility from employees to
algorithms.
This Article is the first to tackle the full extent of the growing doctrinal gap left
by algorithmic corporate misconduct. To hold corporations accountable, the law
must sometimes treat them as if they “know” information stored on their servers
and “intend” decisions reached by their automated systems. Cognitive science
and the philosophy of mind offer a path forward. The “extended mind thesis”
complicates traditional views about the physical boundaries of the mind. The
thesis states that the mind encompasses any system that sufficiently assists
thought, e.g., by facilitating recall or enhancing decisionmaking. For natural
people, the thesis implies that minds can extend beyond the brain to include
external cognitive aids, like rolodexes and calculators. This Article adapts and
applies the thesis to corporate law. It proposes a doctrinal framework for
extending the corporate mind to the algorithms that are increasingly integral to
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Business School), the Business Law and Technology Roundtable (Michigan State University College
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corporate thought. The law needs such an innovation if it is to hold future
corporations accountable for their most serious harms.
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INTRODUCTION
Marvin makes investments on behalf of SciBank trying to maximize
returns. Like all decent investment bankers, Marvin only purchases or
sells positions after methodically collecting and weighing information
about future performance.2 One day, Marvin acquires nonpublic
information that BigCo will make a bid to acquire SmallCo. Marvin’s
models predict that SmallCo’s stock price will shoot up after BigCo
announces its plan. Consequently, Marvin invests in SmallCo and makes
a killing for SciBank.
1

Could SciBank be guilty of insider trading? If Marvin is an employee at
SciBank, there are good grounds for a closer look. Crucially, since Marvin
learned material, nonpublic information in the course of his employment, the
law dictates that SciBank learned it as well.3 SciBank’s liability turns on the
provenance of that information, i.e., whether Marvin misappropriated it4 or
received it as a tip from an insider who stood to benefit from the transaction.5
1. I am grateful to Aaron Ancell at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University,
for this opening conceit.
2. See Bernard Marr, The Revolutionary Way of Using Artificial Intelligence in Hedge Funds, FORBES
(Feb. 15, 2019, 1:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/02/15/the-revolutionaryway-of-using-artificial-intelligence-in-hedge-funds-the-case-of-aidyia/#17eb640157ca
[https://perma.cc/46FA-3YNJ].
3. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491 (1909); Phila.,
Wilmington & Balt. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 209–10 (1858). There are some weak
qualifications. See infra notes 173–77 and accompanying text.
4. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
5. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659–60 (1983).
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But suppose that Marvin is not a human being at all; suppose “Marvin” is
one of many algorithmic trading programs in use today.6 Though Marvin may
still have acquired the information illegitimately (through misappropriation or
an improper tip), the insider trading inquiry immediately aborts. Since Marvin
is not a human employee, the law has no way to say SciBank knew the
information about BigCo’s planned acquisition. That makes liability for insider
trading a nonstarter.7
The SciBank hypothetical is neither futuristic nor idiosyncratic.8
Advanced algorithms utilizing big data and artificial intelligence are rapidly
reshaping every corner of modern business.9 Experts predict that corporate
reliance on digital automation will increase exponentially over the coming
years.10 Algorithms are taking over human functions throughout the corporate
hierarchy, from the lowest-level operations—like the systems running

6. See Marr, supra note 2.
7. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2019).
8. Computer scientists proved years ago that algorithms could teach themselves to manipulate
markets. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1284–86, 1292–94
(2017) (discussing how AI can learn to engage in pump-and-dump manipulation); Enrique MartínezMiranda, Peter McBurney & Matthew J. Howard, Learning Unfair Trading: A Market Manipulation
Analysis from the Reinforcement Learning Perspective, 2016 IEEE CONF. ON EVOLVING & ADAPTIVE
INTELLIGENT SYSS. 103, 108; Ben Van Lier, From High Frequency Trading to Self-Organizing Moral
Machines, 7 INT’L J. TECHNOETHICS 34, 34 (2016) (noting that AI has become increasingly
autonomous in regards to its role in the financial sector); Michael P. Wellman & Uday Rajan, Ethical
Issues for Autonomous Trading Agents, 27 MINDS & MACHINES 609, 614 (2017); Renato Zamagna, The
Future of Trading Belong to Artificial Intelligence, MEDIUM (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/the-future-of-trading-belong-to-artificial-intelligencea4d5887cb677 [http://perma.cc/X5HW-VK2H]; see also Council Regulation 596/2014 of 16 Apr. 2014,
On Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and Repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and
2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J (L. 173) 1; Council Directive 2014/57/EU of 16 Apr. 2014, On Criminal
Sanctions for Market Abuse (Market Abuse Directive), 2014 O.J. (L. 173) 179.
9. See Edward L. Pittman, Quantitative Investment Models, Errors, and the Federal Securities Laws,
13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 633, 643–44 (2017) (discussing near universal use of algorithms and quantitative
tools in investment management); H. James Wilson & Paul R. Daugherty, Collaborative Intelligence:
Humans and AI Are Joining Forces, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2018, at 114, 116–18 (noting the rise of
AI and emphasizing the necessity of collaboration); Dan Wellers, Timo Elliott & Markus Noga, 8 Ways
Machine Learning Is Improving Companies’ Work Processes, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 31, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/05/8-ways-machine-learning-is-improving-companies-work-processes
[http://perma.cc/SP5Q-FZ9W].
10. See SAM RANSBOTHAM ET AL., RESHAPING BUSINESS WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
14
(2017),
https://www.bcg.com/Images/Reshaping%20Business%20with%20Artificial%20
Intelligence_tcm9-177882.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FDZ-L4SX]; Wellers et al., supra note 9.
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Amazon’s box-packing bots11—to the highest—like “Vital,” the algorithm
appointed to the board of Deep Knowledge Ventures.12
Algorithms promise to make corporations more efficient13 and (perhaps)14
more objective,15 but they do not remove (or even always reduce)16 the
possibility that things will sometimes go awry.17 Indeed, the speed and
geographic reach of algorithmic processes means that when things do go wrong,
they can go really wrong for a lot of people in a lot of places at once.18 Real-life
11. Amazon uses robots to receive and automatically package many customer orders. Jeffrey
Dastin, Exclusive: Amazon Rolls out Machines That Pack Orders and Replace Jobs, REUTERS (May 13, 2019,
6:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-automation-exclusive/exclusive-amazonrolls-out-machines-that-pack-orders-and-replace-jobs-idUSKCN1SJ0X1
[https://perma.cc/JY9962T5].
12. Vital is credited with helping Deep Knowledge Ventures avoid bankruptcy by more logically
evaluating potential investments. Nicky Burridge, Artificial Intelligence Gets a Seat in the Boardroom,
NIKKEI ASIA REV. (May 10, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Artificial-intelligence-gets-a-seatin-the-boardroom [https://perma.cc/6SDR-5XGN]. For a general discussion on AI in board rooms, see
Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The “Unmediated” and “Tech-Driven” Corporate
Governance of Today’s Winning Companies, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 75, 114–15 (2019) (“Additionally,
artificial intelligence may soon become an integral part of board decision-making. It is conceivable that
future boards will include a seat for an artificial intelligent board member with voting authority. In the
not too distant future, it seems feasible that artificial intelligence will have an independent board seat
and may be trusted to make smarter data-driven choices than humans.”); Sergio Gramitto, The
Technology and Archaeology of Corporate Law 33–40 (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 18-40,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3232816 [https://perma.cc/K4HQ-E6EP]
(“While artificial intelligence can be used in boardrooms simply to assist human directors with making
decisions, it also has the potential to replace human directors entirely.”).
13. See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV.
54, 65 (2019) (“Algorithms hold tremendous value. Big data promises significant benefits to the
economy, allowing customers to find and sort products more quickly, which in turn lowers search
costs.”).
14. See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 142–45 (2016) (discussing the rise of algorithms as well
as the benefits and issues created by things such as FICO and e-scores); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing
and Governance Administration: The Failure of the American Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1321, 1342 (1992); Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 1, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data [https://perma.cc/5C9K-XYM9].
15. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 23 (2018); Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771, 785
(2017); Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete, WIRED
(June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/ [https://perma.cc/Q5QJEH42].
16. Cade Metz, Is Ethical A.I. Even Possible?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/ethics-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/
YMG8-JPMX (dark archive)].
17. See Bruckner, supra note 15, at 6; Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State
Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611, 1614–16,
1620 (2017) (“Autonomous vehicles will not be perfectly safe.”); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey,
Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV 1311, 1313 (2019) (“As robotics and artificial intelligence (AI)
systems increasingly integrate into our society, they will do bad things.”).
18. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES, at iii (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default
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examples of corporate algorithmic harm that merit a searching liability inquiry
include19:
•
•
•

A lender’s automated platform approving mortgages in a fashion that
has a discriminatory racial impact but might also have a business
justification.20
Competing retailers’ pricing algorithms setting prices at matching,
super-competitive levels.21
A delivery company’s self-driving truck striking a jaywalking
pedestrian.22

Not long ago, corporations relied on human employees to carry out each of these
functions. Today, many corporations use algorithms to approve loans, set
prices, and transport goods.23
The move toward automation does not alter the fact that discrimination,
price fixing, and reckless driving leave victims in their wake.24 These victims,
/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWG5-USYP] (describing
the potential of algorithms to undermine longstanding civil rights protections).
19. A growing scholarly literature discusses others. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 13, at 56.
20. See generally Robin Nunn, Discrimination and Algorithms in Financial Services: Unintended
Consequences of AI, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=ecdd186d-29eb-4821-8161-89b93cf1ef31 [https://perma.cc/9SHT-3Q6V (dark archive)]
(discussing the importance of racially sensitive implementation of AI). For a similar example involving
hiring ads, see Esha Bhandari & Rachel Goodman, ACLU Challenges Computer Crimes Law That Is
Thwarting Research on Discrimination Online, ACLU (June 29, 2016, 10:00 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and-economic-justice/aclu-challenges-computer-crimeslaw-thwarting-research [https://perma.cc/838L-YZEE]. See also Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo,
Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 194 (2016) (discussing the challenges
of such cases).
21. See Emilio Calvano et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, VOX (Feb. 3,
2019),
https://voxeu.org/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithmic-pricing-and-collusion
[https://perma.cc/6WPN-SHXF]; Greg Rosalsky, When Computers Collude, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019, 7:30
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/04/02/708876202/when-computers-collude
[https://perma.cc/ZE2T-6UUE]; see also Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, Two Artificial Neural
Networks Meet in an Online Hub and Change the Future (of Competition, Market Dynamics and Society) 52
(U. Tenn. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 323, July 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2949434 [https://perma.cc/6RNH-YSRN] (discussing “algorithmic price
optimization”).
22. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots Roam,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverlessfatality.html [https://perma.cc/MWD5-D8FK (dark archive)].
23. See generally Ellen Ruppel Shell, AI and Automation Will Replace Most Human Workers Because
They Don’t Have To Be Perfect—Just Better Than You, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/2018/11/30/ai-and-automation-will-replace-most-human-workersbecause-they-dont-have-be-1225552.html [https://perma.cc/BG83-TAT7] (describing how mega-tech
companies are overwhelmingly automating their workforce).
24. For a detailed discussion of the harms of algorithmic discrimination, see O’NEIL, supra note
14, at 13 (“[G]oing to college, borrowing money, getting sentenced to prison, or finding and holding a
job. All of these life domains are increasingly controlled by secret [big data algorithms] wielding
arbitrary punishments.”).
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or the state on their behalf, should have as clear a path to justice as their
counterparts a decade ago. In cases of algorithmic misconduct, it is particularly
important that the path hold open the possibility of corporate liability. As
corporations replace employees with algorithms, corporate liability becomes the
only means of redress. Employees are accountable for their own misconduct,
whether on or off the job.25 Algorithms, however, are not subject to suit.26
The problem is that the law is not equipped to address corporate liability
when the “thinking” behind corporate misconduct has been offloaded to
automated systems.27 Under current law, corporate liability in each of the above
cases would require (and, as I assume below, should require)28 evidence of a
culpable corporate mental state: purpose (to discriminate),29 knowledge (of
competitors’ prices),30 or recklessness (in operating a vehicle).31 The legal
doctrine for attributing mental states to corporations—respondeat superior—
defines corporate mental states in terms of employee mental states.32 Variants
of respondeat superior—like the collective knowledge doctrine, which allows
courts to aggregate employee knowledge,33 and the control group test, which
restricts respondeat superior to higher ranking corporate employees34—only
25. See generally V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1477, 1489–90 (1996) (discussing the doctrine of respondeat superior under which a
corporation can also be held liable for an individual employee’s actions).
26. United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 979 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that “[r]obots
cannot be sued”); Ugo Pagallo, Killers, Fridges, and Slaves: A Legal Journey in Robotics, 26 AI & SOC’Y
347, 349 (2011) (“The common legal standpoint excludes robots from any kind of criminal
responsibility . . . .”).
27. This parallels another philosophical problem: How can data stored digitally have “meaning”?
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Artificial Meaning, 89 WASH. L. REV. 69, 69–70 (2014) (discussing
“the concept of artificial meaning, meanings produced by entities other than individual natural
persons”).
28. See infra Part I.
29. Discrimination cases can be brought even in the absence of purpose if they allege a disparate
impact. See, e.g., CFPB and DOJ Order Ally To Pay $80 Million to Consumers Harmed by Discriminatory
Auto Loan Pricing, CFPB NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-ally-to-pay-80-million-to-consumers-harmed-by-discriminatoryauto-loan-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/KC6K-3BKE]. Where there is a possible business justification for
the disparate treatment (as there generally will be in cases of algorithmic discrimination), the case
becomes much more difficult in the absence of proof of purpose. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst,
Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 711–12, 726 (2016); Stephanie Bornstein,
Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 535 (2018).
30. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7 (2018)); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962) (“[A] corporate officer is subject to
prosecution under § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal
contract, combination, or conspiracy . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.277 (Westlaw through 2019 legislation) (defining the
offense of “reckless driving”).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). I discuss these
weak limits below. See infra Part IV.
33. See United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
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reinforce the current legal fact that corporate mental states must derive from
employee mental states. When corporations misbehave through their employees,
respondeat superior produces relatively straightforward liability
determinations.35 But when corporations misbehave through their algorithms in
ways that, from the outside, look just as purposeful, knowing, or reckless as the
misbehavior carried out by human employees, current liability doctrines do not
apply.36
In a commercial world increasingly run on silicon, it is surprising that the
law’s understanding of the corporate mind is still tied to a prehistoric lump of
grey organic matter. A corporation like JPMorgan has at its fingertips server
data that literally exceeds the storage capacity of, on some calculations, 390,000
human brains.37 Its processors analyze that information, on some estimates,
10,000,000 times faster than any human could.38 If the information and any
conclusions drawn from it do not pass through a human employee’s brain, they
form no part of the law’s present conception of the corporate mind.
The current state of the law is troubling because it all but guarantees that
corporations will become increasingly immune to liability as their operations
require less and less human intervention.39 For example, lacking a theory of
liability, prosecutors declined to file charges against Uber when one of its selfdriving cars struck and killed a pedestrian in Arizona.40 The legal loophole left
by respondeat superior incentivizes an unpalatable form of corporate

35. The results of these straightforward determinations are not particularly compelling. See
Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2056–58 (2016)
[hereinafter Diamantis, Corporate Criminal] (critiquing respondeat superior).
36. Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1234
(2017).
37. See Dakin Campbell, Meet the JPMorgan Banker with No Technical Expertise Who’s Now in
Charge of the Biggest Data Projects on Wall Street, BUS. INSIDER (June 12, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/rob-casper-jpmorgan-data-head-profile-managing-financialaccount-info-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/6BDR-W9SA]; Forrest Wickman, Your Brain’s Technical Specs,
SLATE (Apr. 24, 2012, 8:18 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2012/04/north-koreas-2-mb-ofknowledge-taunt-how-many-megabytes-does-the-human-brain-hold.html [https://perma.cc/6SFRAV4D].
38. Liqun Luo, Why Is the Human Brain So Efficient?, NAUTILUS (Apr. 12, 2018),
http://nautil.us/issue/59/connections/why-is-the-human-brain-so-efficient [https://perma.cc/S2LD44UA].
39. A related set of issues arise as governments use algorithms to perform diverse functions, such
as evaluating social security benefits claims and making parole determinations. See generally Ronald
Bailey, Welcoming Our New Algorithmic Overlords?, REASON (July 8, 2016, 1:30 PM),
https://reason.com/2016/07/08/welcoming-our-new-algorithmic-overlords-2 [https://perma.cc/4DP8SMU6] (discussing the use of algorithms in governmental and judicial decisionmaking).
40. Angie Schmitt, Uber Got off the Hook for Killing a Pedestrian with Its Self-Driving Car,
STREETSBLOG USA (Mar. 8, 2019), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2019/03/08/uber-got-off-the-hookfor-killing-a-pedestrian-with-its-self-driving-car/ [https://perma.cc/3V4D-K2UV] (speculating that
“tech companies won’t be punished for taking egregious risks with their untested technology even when
the worst happens.”).
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gamesmanship. Corporations keen to manage their liabilities41 will seek the safe
haven of algorithmic misconduct rather than chance liability for misconduct by
human employees. By not providing a solution, the law incentivizes
corporations to accelerate their embrace of automation. This dynamic
exacerbates the risk that corporations will turn to algorithms prematurely,
before the technology has been sufficiently tested for socially responsible use.42
The law needs a framework for extending its conception of the corporate
mind beyond the employees whose shoes algorithms are coming to fill. Only
then could the law develop reliable doctrines for evaluating whether
corporations that misbehave through algorithms nonetheless satisfy the mental
state elements of liability. Psychologists and philosophers have recently
addressed a related set of issues about the human mind. They argue that the
traditional understanding of the human mind as limited by the boundaries of
the skull is too restrictive.43 The so-called “extended mind thesis” states that the
human mind reaches beyond the brain to encompass external cognitive aids—
such as diaries or cellphones—that help the brain do its work.44 If a person can
as easily “recollect” a phone number by checking her phone’s memory bank as
by checking her neurological memory bank, her mind may, according to the
thesis, extend to aspects of her phone.45 This Article adapts, with appropriate
modifications, the extended mind thesis to the corporate context. It argues that
the law could and should recognize that corporate minds extend to algorithms
fulfilling roles that were once occupied only by human employees. By extending
the corporate mind in this way, the law could bring corporate accountability
into the twenty-first century.
The proposal developed below is targeted at judges and/or prosecutors.
The liability framework applicable to corporations was largely derived from

41. Corporations are assumed to want to do this. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The
Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING
CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 11, 14–15, 17 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel
E. Barkow eds., 2011).
42. Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith has remarked that “[w]e don’t want
to see a commercial race to the bottom” and stated that “[l]aw is needed.” Metz, supra note 16; see also
Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability
in an Algorithmic Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1244–45 (2017) (describing North Carolina’s attempt
to prohibit legal software manufacturers from attaining a lower standard of liability than attorneys and
the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice’s criticism of North Carolina’s decision).
43. See Andy Clark & David Chalmers, The Extended Mind, 58 ANALYSIS 7, 8–10 (1998)
(introducing the extended mind thesis, which the authors refer to as “active externalism”).
44. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive Enhancement and
the Constitution, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1055–56 (describing Clark and Chalmers’s theory as the
“extended mind”); Clark & Chalmers, supra note 43, at 12–14 (discussing an example involving a
notebook).
45. See Clark & Chalmers, supra note 43, at 12–14. As I discuss further below, the extended mind
thesis does have some limits. See infra Section IV.B.
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common law,46 was introduced to corporate law, and then expanded through
judicial activity.47 As such, judicial decisions are the likeliest point of evolution
for existing doctrine.48 In criminal law, prosecutors also have an important role
to play as gatekeepers for corporate liability. Lacking a theory of liability,
prosecutors may, as with Uber’s reckless driving, decline to bring charges.
Alternatively, prosecutors may address the obvious need for criminal liability
in cases of algorithmic corporate misconduct on their own by coercing out-ofcourt agreements.49 In the absence of a principled approach, prosecutors are
likely to exacerbate rule-of-law50 and accountability51 concerns that others have
raised about how prosecutors resolve suspected cases of corporate crime. The
solution offered below could provide some guidance.
This Article begins by clarifying important aspects of its methodology
(Part I) and offering a focusing hypothetical scenario (Part II). In its chief
substantive contribution, this Article introduces the extended mind thesis (Part
III) and shows in detail how to adapt this concept as a doctrine for addressing
algorithmic corporate misconduct (Part IV). Finally, this Article concludes by
reflecting on broader implications of the extended corporate mind.
I. A MINIMALLY INVASIVE METHOD
There are two typical tools for solving legal problems: sledgehammers and
scalpels. Sledgehammers are for addressing basic structural defects in the law
when the only path forward is wholesale reform. Their basic function is to
demolish and rebuild. This Article’s more modest ambition is to use a scalpel.
46. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 489 (1947) (referring to “the ancient
maxim of the common law, respondeat superior,” which, “[e]ven without special statutory provision[,]
. . . would apply to many relations”).
47. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 474–
75 (2006) (“The law in this area had a weak start nearly a century ago when common law courts, looking
to expand available means for regulating business enterprises, imported respondeat superior liability
from tort law into the criminal law, but without serious theoretical analysis.”).
48. The only serious efforts at reform have come from judges. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of
New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding the trial court’s jury instructions to
impute the “collective knowledge” of all employees to the employer on an issue of respondeat superior
liability).
49. See Brandon L. Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 41, at 154,
157 (“[P]rosecutors typically defer prosecution or agree not to prosecute if a firm will enter into an
agreement.”).
50. See generally Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed
Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191 (2016) (arguing that the wide
variance between the terms prosecutors impose through deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”)
and non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) violates the rule of law).
51. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM:
USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 41, at 110, 110 (“DPAs are
less visible than adjudication, which detracts from both the coherence of the government’s enforcement
strategy and the accountability of prosecutors.”).
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It aims to solve the problem of algorithmic corporate misconduct by making the
smallest possible doctrinal incision. What surgical intervention may sacrifice in
terms of grandiose vision, it makes up in terms of feasibility. It does this by
leveraging existing frameworks and doctrines—in this case, of corporate
liability—to address the problem of algorithmic misconduct. Small changes are
more likely to get real-life traction because they tend to be more palatable to
lawmakers than large changes.52 This feature is the present proposal’s distinctive
advantage.
This Article is about corporate criminal and civil liability for algorithmic
misconduct. True to its surgical aspirations, the remainder of this part flags
some related but ultimately tangential issues. I mean to leave the law on these
issues undisturbed. In doing so, I hope to solve the problem of algorithmic
corporate misconduct while dodging several broader problems that have
interested other theorists.
Some scholars believe that corporate culpability is such a nonsensical
notion53 that the law would be better without it.54 They may be right. After all,
corporations are just fictional agents.55 Perhaps the best solution to algorithmic
corporate misconduct would begin by critically engaging the law’s commitment
to corporate culpability.
In accord with its surgical ambitions, this Article does not question
whether corporations can be (or should be) legally accountable. Instead, it aims,
so far as possible, to leave this corner of the law undisturbed. As I have argued
elsewhere, the law’s general conception of corporations as responsible actors is
psychologically sustainable56 and often makes good policy sense.57 More to the

52. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3–4 (1982); Boris
I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 51–52 (1995); Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and
the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 110–11 (2000) (noting that “public choice is
‘appealing in its parsimoniousness’” and that “[e]ven if we had the ability to dismantle the entire
national regulatory apparatus, we have neither the will nor the desire to do so” (quoting Steven P.
Corley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 7, 15 (2000))); Saul Levmore, Interest Groups
and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (2010) (“Leading commentators
encourage incrementalism. Most of the encouragement is directed at judges, but the arguments used
in favor of incrementalism are equally applicable to regulators and legislators.” (footnote omitted)).
53. See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face
of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 428 (2012) (arguing that corporations cannot possess moral
agency because they have no capacity for moral emotions).
54. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2009).
55. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742–43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The
ordinary corporation is a ‘person’ for purposes of the adjudicatory processes . . . .”).
56. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code
Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 40–41 (1957).
57. See Diamantis, Corporate Criminal, supra note 35, at 2052–53 (explaining why applying a mens
rea to corporations makes sense).
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point, scrapping corporate culpability is a practical nonstarter. The public
broadly supports holding corporations civilly and criminally accountable.58
Consequently, the law of corporate culpability is socially entrenched and
politically bulletproof. Furthermore, the legal edifice built around corporate
culpability is centuries old59 and growing.60 Taking it apart would require a
massive jurisprudential undertaking.
No feature of the law’s framework for corporate culpability is more
integral than the fiction of corporate personhood.61 According to this sociolegal
construct, corporations fit into the law’s liability mechanisms just as other
“people” do.62 Any statute that defines a civil or criminal violation
simultaneously sets out elements of liability for both individuals and
corporations.63 Whatever action a statute requires, it requires of real and
fictional people alike.64 Where, as is most often the case,65 liability also turns on
the person having a concurrent mental state, both individual and corporate
58. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612 (2012).
59. The doctrine was introduced to U.S. civil law in the mid-nineteenth century. See Phila. &
Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 486–87 (1852) (establishing a railroad’s liability
for the negligence of its employee through the doctrine of respondeat superior). Fifty years later, it
came to U.S. criminal law. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,
494–96 (1909) (holding that finding a corporation guilty of committing a crime does not violate the
Constitution).
60. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1481, 1482 (2009).
61. See David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2016) (acknowledging that corporate prosecution is based on the legal
fiction of corporations’ personhood under the law); see also Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) (defining a corporation as an entity “having authority under law to act as a single
person”).
62. See, e.g., Dictionary Act of 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1
(2018)) (defining “person” to include “corporation”); Uhlmann, supra note 61, at 1246. There is an
important distinction between “personhood”—which applies to entities that have rights and
responsibilities—and “peoplehood”—which applies to persons that have minds. While people are
persons, the reverse is not necessarily true, except where the responsibility at issue in personhood is
legal liability that requires mental states. Given this Article’s focus on legal liability of precisely that
sort, I use “people” and “persons” interchangeably to refer to entities that have rights, responsibilities,
and minds.
63. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
64. For example, when a statute defines the crime that applies to “[w]hoever . . . corruptly
persuades another person . . . to . . . destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the
object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding,” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2) (2018), there
is no question that “whoever” includes corporations, see United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374
F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding accounting firm’s conviction for obstruction of justice), rev’d
on other grounds, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 4,
scope note (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (noting that strict liability is generally limited to torts involving
abnormally dangerous activity, possession of animals, and products liability); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998) (explaining the development of strict liability in
products liability cases); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 39 (2006) (“Strict liability statutes remain the
exception in our criminal law system, not the rule, and have a generally disfavored status.”).
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defendants must satisfy that mental state to be liable.66 Some theorists think
that because corporations are not really people, the law should abandon its
pretense to the contrary.67 These theorists argue that the law’s present reliance
on corporate mental states makes for ineffective justice68 and suboptimal
prevention.69 Removing any reference to corporate mental states would convert
all corporate liability into strict liability.
This Article is not about the advisability of the law’s fiction of corporate
personhood. The law can indulge this fiction regardless of whether70 or not71
corporations really are people. Indeed, the fact that the law self-consciously
invokes a “fiction” of corporate personhood is itself a concession that
corporations are not really people and do not really have mental states.72 As I
have argued elsewhere, this pretense helps the law accomplish its basic goals.
The fiction that corporations can have culpable mental states helps the law
identify truly reprehensible corporate conduct (as opposed to merely harmful
conduct) for distinctive treatment.73 Additionally, despite all the sophisticated
economic theory endorsing strict corporate liability,74 that approach often

66. Khanna, supra note 25, at 1489 (“[Among the] requirements [that] must be met in order to
impose liability on a corporation . . . a corporate agent must have committed an illegal act (the actus
reus) with the requisite state of mind (the mens rea).”); W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal
Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905, 914–15 (2019) (“[T]he practice of holding commercial corporations
criminally responsible for general intent crimes as well as specific intent crimes—crimes for which
there exists a proscribed action (actus reus) pursued concurrently with a prescribed attitude (mens
rea)—took hold around the turn of the twentieth century.”).
67. See John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 310, 349–53 (2004) (describing how corporate defendants’ differences from human
defendants place them at a disadvantage).
68. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways To Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1392 (2009) [hereinafter Alschuler, Two Ways To Think] (arguing that two possible
legal analogies for corporate punishment—deodand, “the punishment of animals and inanimate objects
that produced harm,” or frankpledge, “the punishment of all members of a group when one member of
the group has avoided apprehension for a crime”—show its absurdity).
69. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320–21
(1996) (arguing that imposing criminal liability on corporations results in overdeterrence).
70. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 1–2 (2011) (arguing that corporations are agents).
71. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: A NEW TRANSLATION 89–90 (Keith Tribe ed. &
trans., 2019) (arguing that corporations are not agents).
72. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[T]he corporate personality
is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact . . . .”).
73. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal, supra note 35, at 2063–64.
74. See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 69, at 328 (“[W]here the agent’s crime is properly viewed
as a cost of corporate activity, it seems appropriate that the corporation should bear ‘strict’ liability for
the social cost of the crime . . . . The conventional justification for strict vicarious liability . . . [is] the
importance of cost internalization.”); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1222, 1228–29 (1985) (“In effect we introduce a degree of strict liability into
criminal law as into tort law when a change in activity level is an efficient method of avoiding a social
cost.”).
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results in inefficient overdeterrence75 and overinvestment in compliance.76
Regardless of its (de)merits, abandoning the fiction of corporate personhood
would require a sweeping reimagination of current corporate law. It would
therefore be contrary to the surgical approach adopted here. This Article
situates itself within the law’s fictions of corporate personhood and corporate
mentality. Its goal is to find a sensible extension of that fiction to accommodate
cases of algorithmic corporate misconduct.77
Once again, this Article will not claim, implicitly or otherwise, that
corporations actually do have mental states. Instead, it explores what it would
mean as a conceptual matter for corporations to think things. Since the law is
committed to a fiction in which corporations have mental states, what is it also
committed to? What shape can or must that fiction take? As shown below, the
answers to those questions could hold the solution to the problem of algorithmic
corporate misconduct.
Lastly, this Article will not follow the lead of scholars in law,78 computer
science,79 and business ethics80 who propose addressing algorithmic misconduct
head-on by holding the algorithms themselves liable. That approach is deeply
controversial. It is far from clear that algorithms presently do, or ever could,81
satisfy the conditions of personhood and culpability.82 Even theorists who
75. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440–43 (1978); Developments in the
Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1227, 1270 (1979).
76. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 348–
49 (2019) [hereinafter Diamantis, Functional Corporate] (explaining how the collective knowledge
approach leads to extreme focus on compliance).
77. By situating itself within the legal fiction of corporate personhood, this Article need not make
any controversial assumptions about the true metaphysics of corporations.
78. See GABRIEL HALLEVY, LIABILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEMS 27–28 (2015); Steven J. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of Artificial Intelligence
Software, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623, 624–25 (1987); Christina Mullitan, Revenge Against Robots, 69
S.C. L. REV. 579, 579–80 (2018).
79. See Fahad Alaieri & André Vellino, Ethical Decision Making in Robots: Autonomy, Trust and
Responsibility, in SOCIAL ROBOTICS: 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 159, 159 (Arvin Agah et al.
eds., 2016) (“[N]on-predictability and autonomy may confer a greater degree of responsibility to the
machine . . . .”); Luciano Floridi & J.W. Sanders, On the Morality of Artificial Agents, 14 MINDS &
MACHINES 349, 373–74 (2004); Gabriel Hallevy, Unmanned Vehicles: Subordination to Criminal Law
Under the Modern Concept of Criminal Liability, 21 J. L. INFO. & SCI. 200, 200 (2011).
80. See Nicholas Diakopoulos & Sorelle Friedler, How To Hold Algorithms Accountable, MIT
TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602933/how-to-hold-algorithmsaccountable/ [https://perma.cc/4B7Z-X6MF (dark archive)].
81. See JOHN SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE 30–31 (1984) (arguing that computers
cannot think); Thomas C. King et al., Artificial Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of
Foreseeable Threats and Solutions, 26 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 89, 95, 102 (2019) (noting both that
“the idea that an [algorithm] can act voluntarily is contentious” and that an artificial agent “cannot
itself meet the mens rea requirement [of a crime]”).
82. See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27–52
(1909) (discussing legal personhood).
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propose a fictionalizing approach to algorithmic personhood (analogous to the
law’s fiction of corporate personhood)83 face two formidable obstacles. First, no
one has proposed a satisfactory answer to when it would make sense to hold
algorithms responsible. Anything an algorithm does is ultimately a product of
its environment and its programming.84 As such, it is hard to see when the
algorithm, rather than its environment or its programmer, would be culpable.
For example, in 2016, Microsoft launched a chatbot, “Tay,” to communicate
with teens online.85 Tay was supposed to teach itself to talk by learning from
data it scraped from Twitter.86 Within twenty-four hours, internet users had
baited Tay with enough corrupting tweets that the bot’s messages became
chauvinistic, racist, and anti-Semitic.87 It is far from clear, though, that Tay was
to blame for the things it said and not Microsoft or a corrosive “Twitterverse.”88
This leads to the second difficulty with direct algorithmic liability: Even if the
law were to find an algorithm like Tay responsible, then what? There is no way
to sanction an algorithm or bot89 (short, perhaps, of killing it, as Microsoft did
to Tay).90 We can jail or fine other “people,” but algorithms lack bodies and
pocketbooks.91

83. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1239–
43 (1992) (comparing the case for AI personhood and corporate personhood).
84. See DAVID A. PATTERSON & JOHN L. HENNESSY, COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND
DESIGN: THE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERFACE 13–15 (5th ed. 2014) (ebook); Anupam Chandler,
The Racist Algorithm, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1034–37 (2017). This is not to deny that problems with
algorithms can arise in other ways, as when, for example, an algorithm designed for one use is put to a
different use. See Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO SYS. 330, 330–32 (1996).
85. See Elle Hunt, Tay, Microsoft’s AI Chatbot, Gets a Crash Course in Racism from Twitter,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2016, 2:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/24/taymicrosofts-ai-chatbot-gets-a-crash-course-in-racism-from-twitter [https://perma.cc/B933-9RQS].
86. See id.
87. Damon Beres, Microsoft Chat Bot Goes on Racist, Genocidal Twitter Rampage, HUFFPOST (Mar.
24,
2016,
10:19
AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/microsoft-tay-racist-tweets_n_
56f3e678e4b04c4c37615502 [https://perma.cc/GP9Z-YLG7].
88. See James Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot To Be a Racist Asshole in Less Than a
Day, VERGE (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:43 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/taymicrosoft-chatbot-racist [https://perma.cc/M4BU-VDVQ].
89. See Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D. Grant, Of, For, and By the People:
The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons, 25 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 273, 288 (2017); Solum,
supra note 83, at 1244–48 (discussing difficulties of punishing algorithms). But see Gabriel Hallevy, “I,
Robot—I, Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of AI Robots Committing
Criminal Offenses, 22 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 29–35 (2010) [hereinafter Hallevy, I, Robot]
(offering unpersuasive accounts of diverse AI punishments).
90. See Rob Price, Microsoft Is Deleting Its AI Chatbot’s Incredibly Racist Tweets, BUS. INSIDER (Mar.
24, 2016, 7:31 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-deletes-racist-genocidal-tweets-fromai-chatbot-tay-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/8C2R-2LXJ (dark archive)].
91. See generally Ryan Abbott & Alex Sarch, Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or Science
Fiction, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 323 (2019) (discussing the difficulties in traditionally “punishing”
algorithms for misconduct and ultimately rejecting the possibility of punishing algorithms).
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Regardless of whether the law could or should hold algorithms directly
liable, its present approach is clear: algorithms are not people and they cannot
be civil or criminal defendants.92 Reversing course would require the swing of
a sledgehammer. This Article limits itself to corporate liability for algorithmic
misconduct because the law has already settled that corporations are responsible
“persons.” As evidenced by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provisions on
organizations, the law also already has longstanding mechanisms for sanctioning
corporations.93 The surgical approach adopted here draws on that existing legal
structure to ask: Under what conditions should corporations be liable when their
algorithms engage in misconduct? It thereby avoids the conceptual,
philosophical, legal, and pragmatic challenges of holding algorithms directly
accountable.94
Despite the significant difficulties posed by corporate algorithmic
misconduct, the legal revisions this Article proposes are relatively modest. The
solution it seeks should be an extension, rather than a rewriting, of current law.
The solution should embrace the present law of corporate liability, including
the fiction of corporate personhood and culpable mental states. It should avoid
imposing strict liability on corporations, which is politically unfeasible and
would overly impede corporate innovation. Lastly, it should not require a new
body of law establishing the legal personhood or accountability of algorithms.
Under the solution offered below, algorithms do not think or know things.
Rather, corporations think or know things through the algorithms they use.
The general strategy proposed below leverages a quirk of current corporate
law according to which corporations are people and can have mental states. The
argument steps into that fiction and explores what its implications are. In light
of the kind of “minds” the law says corporations have, there is little reason to
say that algorithms cannot play a role in determining what corporations think
and know.
II. HEALTHCO AND FORMBOT: A CLARIFYING EXAMPLE
The following hypothetical highlights some of the challenges that a
solution to the problem of algorithmic corporate misconduct must address:

92. See Thomas Beardsworth & Nishant Kumar, Who To Sue When a Robot Loses Your Fortune,
BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-06/whoto-sue-when-a-robot-loses-your-fortune [https://perma.cc/27PX-4E49] (“Robots are getting more
humanoid every day, but they still can’t be sued.”).
93. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
94. This is not to say that the law will not eventually need to find a way to hold algorithms directly
accountable. The solution proposed here will not work when algorithms acting alone, and not on behalf
of a corporation, engage in misconduct.
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HealthCo is a corporation that provides a wide array of services to
Medicare and Medicaid-eligible patients. To save costs, HealthCo asked
its data engineers to develop FormBot, a machine-learning algorithm
trained to complete and file federal reimbursement forms as efficiently
as possible. After several months in operation, FormBot learned on its
own that it could secure more reimbursements in less time if it used fake
information for some of the forms. Nobody at HealthCo knew about or
expected this development. By the time federal authorities discovered
the fake forms, HealthCo had received millions of dollars in improper
reimbursements.
Did HealthCo violate the criminal95 or civil96 provisions of the False Claims
Act, which prohibit knowingly submitting false claims to the federal
government?
There are several things to note about the HealthCo example. First, it
zeroes in on one of the challenges posed by the problem of algorithmic
misconduct. There is no doubt under current law that corporations can violate
the False Claims Act.97 HealthCo satisfies the objective elements of the
violation because it submitted false claims to the federal government. The
sticking point is the False Claims Act’s knowledge requirement. If a HealthCo
employee had submitted the forms knowing they contained fake information,
the case for liability would be pretty clear.98 However, under the facts of the
hypothetical, current law dictates neither civil nor criminal liability. HealthCo
could not have known the forms were fake because none of its human employees
did. Automatically terminating the liability inquiry in this way is worrying.
Public coffers were harmed. The fact that HealthCo used an algorithm rather
than an employee does not alter society’s interest in deterring or condemning
such conduct. At a minimum, the circumstances warrant a more discriminating
liability inquiry.
Second, criminal liability is also at issue in the hypothetical. This is
important because criminal law arguably has the biggest stake in getting
corporate mental states right. Some scholars tout the efficiency benefits of strict
liability standards in civil law,99 particularly in the corporate context.100 But
criminal law concerns itself with more than efficiency.101 Criminal law would
95. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2018).
96. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2018).
97. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 614–16 (1949).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 470–71 (3d Cir. 1998).
99. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–67 (1972) (advocating for a strict liability test in torts but noting some weaknesses
in such an approach).
100. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 69, at 327–28.
101. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the
Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). But see Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170, 172 (1968) (focusing on an
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not fulfill its distinctive condemnatory102 and powerful deterrent functions103 if
it relied only on strict liability. Strict liability overlooks differences that matter
to victims demanding justice and to defendants facing punishment. It treats the
innocent dupe, the hapless fool, and the calculating villain all alike.104 A system
of criminal law that makes no reference to mental states would be
unrecognizable.105
Third, the particular mental state at issue for HealthCo is knowledge.106
Every type of mental state has its own distinctive properties and would ideally
receive a separate discussion. Though there are over one hundred different
types of mens rea among the provisions of the federal criminal code alone,107
knowledge is an element of many of the most common corporate crimes.108 The
solution proposed below, while framed in terms of knowledge, should serve as
a template for other mental states. Knowledge is a convenient starting point
since that is where existing literature on the extended mind thesis tends to
focus.109
Lastly, the hypothetical specifies technical details that make the problem
of algorithmic misconduct particularly intractable. HealthCo’s engineers
programmed FormBot using machine learning. Very roughly, machine learning
techniques start by specifying the algorithm’s goal and then train the algorithm
with a large set of test cases.110 By telling the algorithm in each test case whether
economic and efficiency-based approach to determining criminal punishments). See generally Jeremy
Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 366 (John Bowring ed.,
1962) (explaining the goals of criminal law and what it offers both to victims and society).
102. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965).
103. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 500, 510–
12 (2006).
104. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability:
The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 687–90 (1983) (discussing how the criminal
law uses different mental state elements to determine culpability).
105. This is why Rebecca Crootof, proposing strict state liability for harms caused by warfare AI,
turns from criminal law to tort law. Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347, 1387–88 (2016).
106. It bears noting that the legal definition of knowledge is not the same as the philosophical
definition. In the law, a person knows some information if she believes it and it is true. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(i)–(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Philosophers have additional requirements for
knowledge, one of which is that the person also have a justification for her belief. See PAUL K. MOSER
& ARNOLD VANDER NAT, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES
3 (2d ed. 1995). I am using “knowledge” in the legal sense consistent with its meaning in the False
Claims Act.
107. See William S. Laufer, Culpability and the Sentencing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1049,
1065 (1992).
108. See Diamantis, Functional Corporate, supra note 76, 322–23 (listing examples).
109. Notable exceptions include Mark Rowlands, Consciousness, Broadly Construed, in THE
EXTENDED MIND 271, 271 (Richard Menary ed., 2010) (ebook), and Mattia Gallotti & Bryce Huebner,
Collective Intentionality and Socially Extended Minds, 30 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 251, 252–53 (2017).
110. See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 668 (2017); Jason Brownlee, Supervised and Unsupervised
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or not it attained its goal, the algorithm can eventually learn to succeed on its
own.111 For example, engineers might want to design a drone-flying algorithm
to take the most efficient route to a target.112 They would code this goal and
then train the drone by putting it in various places around the target, seeing
where it goes, and telling the algorithm whether its performance was successful
or not. If all goes well, the drone should learn to seek out the target reliably and
efficiently.
The significance of machine learning for algorithmic misconduct is
twofold. First, machine learning is behind the most sophisticated AI systems.113
As the social threat of corporate algorithmic misconduct expands, machine
learning is likely to predominate. Second, machine learning raises the
possibility that algorithms will misbehave without any intervening human
misconduct.114 In the hypo, HealthCo’s engineers did not design FormBot to
submit fake forms, and no one knew or expected that it would. This is realistic
because machine learning algorithms effectively write their own code.115 The
resulting algorithms become so complicated that programmers analyzing the
code afterwards often cannot understand how it works.116 Additionally, many
algorithms have built-in randomness as an essential part of their design.117
Consequently, machine learning algorithms can behave in unintended and
unanticipated (and unanticipatable) ways.118 In hindsight, aberrant results often
trace back to some feature of the machine learning process: how the goal was
specified, the set of test cases used to train the algorithm, or some interaction

Machine Learning Algorithms, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://machinelearningmastery.com/supervised-and-unsupervised-machine-learning-algorithms/
[https://perma.cc/DSF4-TZAU].
111. See A Beginner’s Guide to Neural Networks and Deep Learning, PATHMIND: A.I. WIKI,
https://skymind.ai/wiki/neural-network [https://perma.cc/P59K-RJ45].
112. See Lemley & Casey, supra note 17, at 1313–14 (discussing this example).
113. See id. at 1335 (“[T]he unpredictability inherent in machine learning is also one of its greatest
strengths.”).
114. See generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE
ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD (2015) (outlining how current
algorithms function and the positive and potentially negative impacts of machine learning on their
functions). Ryan Abbott and Alex Sarch call this behavior “Hard AI Crime[].” Abbott & Sarch, supra
note 91, at 328.
115. See Abbott & Sarch, supra note 91, at 330–31.
116. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1089–90, 1092 (2018); Matthew Carroll, The Complexities of Governing
Machine Learning, DATANAMI (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.datanami.com/2017/04/27/complexitiesgoverning-machine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/H3EU-LB4J].
117. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 655 (2017).
118. Lemley & Casey, supra note 17, at 1365 (“[M]uch of the [algorithmic] misconduct that
tomorrow’s designers, policymakers, and watchdogs must guard against might not be intentional at
all.”).
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between these two factors and the real world.119 Due to the code’s complexity,
problems can arise even if every human involved is fully innocent.120
In the drone example from above, the engineers at one point observed the
drone doing the exact opposite of what they had intended—flying away from
the target to the perimeter of the test area.121 After some investigation, they
found that this was not a malfunction. The drone learned that in some
circumstances, the most efficient way to get to the target was to fly to the
perimeter of the test area.122 If the drone did that, it learned that the engineers
would retrieve it and carry it to the target to reset the trial. Being carried rather
than flying was sometimes the most efficient route to the target, though that is
clearly not what the engineers intended the drone to do.
The fact that FormBot used machine learning and filed fake forms without
anyone designing it to do so ensures that the violation in the hypothetical is a
pure case of algorithmic misconduct.123 Otherwise, the case might just involve
ordinary employee misconduct, albeit misconduct mediated by an algorithm.
The law already has mechanisms to handle cases where employees purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly design algorithms to break the law.124 In the
hypothetical, if a HealthCo engineer purposely or knowingly designed
FormBot to submit fake forms, respondeat superior would attribute the
engineer’s mental state to HealthCo, thereby satisfying the False Claims Act’s
requirement.125 It would not matter that the engineer did not physically submit
the forms herself.126 If the engineer recklessly designed FormBot, willful
119. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 117, at 693–94; Lemley & Casey, supra note 118, at 1313.
120. KEVIN PETRASIC ET AL., ALGORITHMS AND BIAS: WHAT LENDERS NEED TO KNOW 1
(2017), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/algorithm-riskthought-leadership.pdf [https://perma.cc/36YD-VWTW] (“[A] perfectly well-intentioned algorithm
may inadvertently generate biased conclusions that discriminate against protected classes of people.”);
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 29, at 729 (explaining that errors “may be the result of entirely innocent
choices made by data miners”).
121. Lemley & Casey, supra note 17, at 1313.
122. Id.
123. It is thus unlike some examples that other criminal scholarship has focused on. See, e.g.,
Amanda McAllister, Note, Stranger than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. Interrogation in the Dawn of
Autonomous Robots and the Need for an Additional Protocol to the U.N. Convention Against Torture, 101
MINN. L. REV. 2527, 2545, 2547 (2017).
124. See Hallevy, I, Robot, supra note 89, at 9 (discussing different models of criminal liability for
crimes involving robots premised on programmer or user fault).
125. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
126. Causing a claim to be submitted falsely explicitly satisfies the civil version of the False Claims
Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2018). For criminal law, other liability doctrines fill the gap. See 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) (2018) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.”); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.04(1)(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985) (stating that a person may be guilty of soliciting an
innocent functionary to commit a crime). The actus reus and mens rea elements of a crime may be
satisfied by different parts of the corporation. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, N.A.,
821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
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ignorance might provide a basis for saying she, and hence HealthCo, had
constructive knowledge of the fake forms.127 What current doctrine cannot
handle, and what this Article addresses, are the most worrying cases where
employee misconduct is removed from the picture.128 A solution for cases of
purely algorithmic corporate misconduct will also provide an alternate route to
corporate liability in situations where an individual employee may have been at
fault, but where proving so is difficult.129
III. THE EXTENDED MIND THESIS
It is time to modernize the law’s conception of corporate mentality. The
law can only properly hold corporations accountable by creating the possibility
that they sometimes “know” the information readily available on their servers
and “intend” the decisions reached by their algorithms. Many cognitive
scientists and philosophers understand mental states in a way that could lay the
foundation for reaching beyond respondeat superior’s exclusive focus on
employees. The present part describes this understanding as applied to natural
people. The next part broadens the theory and shows how to adapt it, both in
principle and in law, to corporate people.
The “extended mind thesis” states that the human mind is not always
constrained by the physical boundaries of the brain.130 Extended mind theorists
typically endorse a “functionalist” account of mental states.131 According to
functionalism, mental states are characterized by the cognitive role they play
connecting inputs (like environmental cues and other mental states) to outputs
(like new mental states or behavior).132 For example, if a person desires ice
cream and walks to the freezer, there is a good chance it is because she believes
ice cream is there. A rough defining characteristic of belief (e.g., that there is
ice cream in the freezer) is that it relates desire inputs (e.g., for ice cream) and
127. See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (explaining that, in
the Court’s view, willful blindness “surpasses recklessness and negligence”).
128. Or not provable in the picture. See generally Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy
Attorney Gen., to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF
[https://perma.cc/6BH5-D2FC] (discussing the procedure for bringing criminal charges against
corporations and the difficulties in identifying wrongdoers).
129. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 29, at 692–93 (describing how computer programs can mask
human misconduct); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
857, 884–85 (2017) (discussing misconduct and algorithms in the context of “intentional
discrimination”).
130. Clark & Chalmers, supra note 43, at 14.
131. See, e.g., id. (“What makes some information count as a belief is the role it plays, and there is
no reason why the relevant role can be played only from inside the body.”); Richard Menary,
Introduction: The Extended Mind in Focus to THE EXTENDED MIND, supra note 109, at 1, 5 (describing
the “functionalist credentials of [extended mind theory]”); Michael Wheeler, In Defense of Extended
Functionalism, in THE EXTENDED MIND, supra note 109, at 245, 245.
132. GILBERT HARMAN, REASONING, MEANING, AND MIND 236–39 (1999) (ebook).
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behavioral outputs (e.g., walking to the freezer).133 According to functionalism,
any state that appropriately relates desires and behavior in this way could be a
belief.
One important corollary of functionalism is its neutrality about the
systems that realize mental states. For example, it does not matter what the
system is made of.134 Human neurons clearly can do the job. But so could
systems made of complex arrangements of different material, whether organic
(e.g., animal or alien brains) or inorganic (e.g., very sophisticated arrangements
of cogs or circuits).
Similarly, functionalism also does not care where the systems realizing
mental states reside. The seminal work in extended mind theory puts the point
as a “Parity Premise”: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world
functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation
in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is . . .
part of the cognitive process.”135 Typically, the systems underwriting human
mental states are located within the skull. But a person whose brain protrudes
beyond her skull could still have mental states in the protruding part. This could
be true even if her brain part was quite distal, connected by long neurons. All
that would matter is that the part had everything it needed (the right internal
organization and the right connections to the rest of the brain) to carry out
mental state functions.
Combining the insights of the previous two paragraphs—neutrality as to
material and as to location—allows extended mind theorists to talk about a
broad range of more meaningful examples. The following two cases illustrate136:
Alice wants to walk from her house to a new café. She looks up the
directions on her computer and commits them to memory. She then sets
off and easily finds her way.
Barry also wants to walk from his house to the new café. He suffers from
Alzheimer’s and has trouble remembering things. He looks up the
directions on his computer and carefully writes them into his diary. He
then sets off. By checking his diary for guidance at each turn, he easily
finds his way.

133. See BRIAN LOAR, MIND AND MEANING 6–9 (1981) (explaining the belief-desire theory).
134. See Menary, supra note 131, at 6 (“[I]t is not the physical properties that matter to [extended
mind theory], however, but the functionality of the process.”); Hilary Putnam, Psychological Predicates,
in ART, MIND, AND RELIGION 37, 44–45 (W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill eds., 1967); J.J.C. Smart,
Sensations and Brain Processes, 68 PHIL. REV. 141, 150 (1959).
135. Clark & Chalmers, supra note 43, at 8; Menary, supra note 131, at 5.
136. The following hypothetical is based on the hypothetical used by Andy Clark & David
Chalmers. See id. at 12–16 (discussing a similar hypothetical in which Inga uses her memory to get to
a museum and Otto uses a notebook).
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There is no doubt that Alice knew how to get to the store after she looked up
the directions. But did Barry? His diary entries seem to play a functional role
similar to the directional information encoded in Alice’s neurons. Input: desire
to visit café. Output: accurately and easily walking there. Alice and Barry share
the same functional relationship between inputs and outputs. Extended mind
theorists conclude that since Alice knew how to get to the café, so did Barry.
To resist that conclusion, critics of the extended mind thesis need to find
a meaningful difference between Alice and Barry. As it happens, that is difficult
to do. One obvious difference is that Barry’s “knowledge” is outside his cranium
and encoded on paper. Alice’s is in her skull and encoded in neurons. But the
significance of that difference is precisely what the extended mind thesis calls
into doubt. Relying on it to defeat the thesis would be question-begging.
Another possible difference is that Alice may have faster recall of the
information, while Barry has to take time to look it up in his diary. But that
difference, while not question-begging, is also not meaningful. To see why,
consider what it would mean for Alice. What if she had to ponder at each turn
(for longer than it took Barry to read his diary) before recollecting which way
to go? Clearly that would not undermine her claim to know the directions.
Maybe the relevant difference between Alice and Barry is that Barry could lose
his diary on the way.137 But Alice could also lose her memories: a falling tree
branch or a stroke could disrupt her fragile neural connections. In the absence
of a meaningful difference between Alice and Barry, advocates of the extended
mind thesis reaffirm that Barry must have known the directions. His mind
extends to the diary pages on which the directions are written.
Moving beyond ad hoc arguments about individual cases, extended mind
theorists propose general criteria for evaluating when a person counts as
knowing externally housed information. These criteria are supposed to capture
the functional relationship between a person and information she knows in
paradigmatic cases. Assuming a person uses information to direct her
behavior,138 the most commonly accepted criteria are that
1.
2.

the information is available and the subject typically invokes it;
the subject more or less automatically endorses (i.e., is prepared to
act on and reason with) the information upon retrieval; and

137. See id. at 15 (discussing the fact that, in a similar hypo, a notebook on which memories are
written or stored may be taken away). See generally Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, The Bounds of
Cognition, 14 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 43, 55–56, 62–63 (2001) (noting the differences in the cognitive process
between memorizing directions and following written directions); Robert D. Rupert, Representation in
Extended Cognitive Systems: Does the Scaffolding of Language Extend the Mind?, in THE EXTENDED MIND,
supra note 109, at 325, 325 (arguing that “external bits of language do not become part of [the cognitive]
system”).
138. Extended mind theorists call this “causal coupling” and set out criteria for it. Menary, supra
note 131, at 3–4.
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the subject can easily access the information.139

Both Alice and Barry satisfy these conditions with respect to their directional
information. More generally, anyone who uses information to direct her
behavior and satisfies the conditions counts as knowing it, regardless of where
or how the information is stored: on neurons, diaries, tattoos, rolodexes, cell
phones, laptops, wherever.
While the last few paragraphs focused on philosophical arguments, many
cognitive scientists also endorse the extended mind thesis. They recognize
several types of extended cognitive systems.140 Some of these systems involve
an individual person using external objects. For example, a person may use
fingers or pebbles as an aid to long-form arithmetic when juggling several
numbers in memory proves difficult.141 Other extended cognitive systems are
made up of multiple individuals, e.g., navigational teams,142 large-scale scientific
research,143 and transactive memory systems.144 Cognitive scientists draw on
themes reflected in the extended mind thesis to explain phenomena in situated
cognition,145 robotics,146 and child development.147 The theory of embodied
cognition provides the framework for this perspective: “Many features of
cognition . . . are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body
139. Andy Clark, Mementos Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended, in THE EXTENDED MIND,
supra note 109, at 43, 46.
140. I should also note that this view is far from uncontroversial in cognitive science. See, e.g.,
ROBERT D. RUPERT, COGNITIVE SYSTEMS AND THE EXTENDED MIND 61 (2009) (critiquing a
realization-based argument for extended cognition); Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, Why the Mind is
Still in the Head, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SITUATED COGNITION 78, 78 (Philip Robbins
& Murat Aydede eds., 2009) (arguing against the extended mind theory and stating that “the mind is
still in the head”).
141. See generally MERLIN DONALD, ORIGINS OF THE MODERN MIND (1991) (exploring the
emergence of visual symbolism and external memory as a major evolutionary transition for humans’
cognitive ability).
142. See EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD 26 (1995) (discussing navigational
teams); see also Edwin Hutchins, The Social Organization of Distributed Cognition, in PERSPECTIVES ON
SOCIALLY SHARED COGNITION 283, 305–06 (Lauren B. Resnik et al., eds., 1991) (discussing group
cognitive networks and properties).
143. See Ronald N. Giere & Barton Moffatt, Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social
Merge, 33 SOC. STUD. SCI. 301, 301–03 (2003).
144. Transactive memory is a system in which a group of people encodes, stores, and retrieves
data. See Daniel M. Wegner, A Computer Network Model of Human Transactive Memory, 13 SOC.
COGNITION 319, 319–20 (1995).
145. See generally LUCY A. SUCHMAN, PLANS AND SITUATED ACTIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF
HUMAN MACHINE COMMUNICATION (1987) (exploring how human action is related to social and
physical circumstances).
146. See generally RANDALL D. BEER, INTELLIGENCE AS ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR: AN
EXPERIMENT IN COMPUTATIONAL NEUROETHOLOGY 1–18 (B. Chandrasekaran ed., 1990)
(discussing different theories of intelligence and the idea of adaptive intelligence).
147. See generally ESTHER THELEN & LINDA B. SMITH, A DYNAMIC SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITION AND ACTION (1996) (ebook) (discussing generally the
development of cognitive abilities in young children).

98 N.C. L. REV. 893 (2020)

916

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

. . . [which] play[] a significant causal role . . . in that agent’s cognitive
processing.”148 The basic idea is that minds are not so much tools for “thinking,”
but tools for doing things in the world.149 From there, it is a short step to the
extended mind thesis.150 Conceptualizing the mind as a tool naturally lends itself
to a functional characterization linking environmental cues and accomplished
tasks. The systems that help us accomplish those tasks in the presence of the
specified environmental cues qualify as part of our minds.
IV. EXTENDING THE CORPORATE MIND
The extended mind thesis suggests that the traditional boundaries defining
where mental states reside are too restrictive. In the context of individual
humans, the thesis means that the mind is not limited to the brain: it can extend
to external cognitive aids like diaries and cell phones. If the thesis carries over
to the corporate context, then corporate minds can also extend beyond their
traditional limits—the minds of individual employees—to include other
functionally integrated corporate systems.
Though extended mind advocates have so far only talked about natural
people,151 parallel arguments could apply for corporate people too. The starting
premise is that corporations have minds. The law takes care of that premise by
directing us to assume corporations are people.152 Corporate mental states, the
law presently tells us, reside within the heads of employees. A functionalist
understanding of mental states implies that any systems carrying out the same
functional roles as employees could also form part of the corporate mind.153 The
Parity Premise, quoted in the previous section, could easily adapt to the
148. Robert A. Wilson & Lucia Foglia, Embodied Cognition, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec.
8, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/ [https://perma.cc/X9F5-QG5E].
149. See ANDY CLARK, BEING THERE: PUTTING BRAIN, BODY, AND WORLD TOGETHER
AGAIN 196 (1997) (ebook).
150. See generally Rupert, supra note 137 (discussing cognitive processing and the extended mind
thesis).
151. One fascinating article argues that group minds could be formed from the extension of
individual minds to other individual minds. Deborah Perron Tollefsen, From Extended Mind to
Collective Mind, 7 COGNITIVE SYS. RES., 2006, at 140, 140–41 (2006). In Tollefsen’s view, the group
mind is the result of the extension, not (as I propose here) the mind which is extended. See id. at 146.
She explicitly excludes AI from her view. See id. at 141 (stating that her article focused on collective
systems “constituted primarily by humans”).
152. See United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123, 125 (1958) (“[I]t is elementary
that such impersonal entities can be guilty of ‘knowing’ or ‘willful’ violations of regulatory statutes
through the doctrine of respondeat superior.”).
153. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration seems open to a similar sort of
functional reasoning. See Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Opinion Letter on Applicability of
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards to Google’s Self-Driving Vehicles (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Google%20--%20compiled%20response%20to%2012%20Nov%20%
2015%20interp%20request%20--%204%20Feb%2016%20final.htm
[https://perma.cc/7MQF-YD95]
(“If no human occupant of the vehicle can actually drive the vehicle, it is more reasonable to identify
the ‘driver’ as whatever (as opposed to whoever) is doing the driving.”).
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corporate context: if a part of the world functions as a corporate process which,
were it performed by an employee, the law would accept as part of the corporate
mind, then that part of the world is part of the corporate mind.154 Significantly,
that “part of the world” could be a smart algorithm running corporate
operations. This extension of the corporate mind from human employees to
automated algorithms would strike many computer scientists as quite natural.
The classic definition of artificial intelligence is functional: any algorithm that
“mak[es] a machine behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a human
were so behaving.”155
The argument for the extended mind thesis should be even easier for
corporations than it is for humans. Corporate minds are, like corporations
themselves, socially constructed objects.156 It is solely by dint of legal fiat157 that
corporations have minds at all or that they share the mental states of their
employees.158 This removes the main intuitive barriers to the extended mind
thesis. For human beings, there is a natural alternative to saying the mind
encompasses all functionally integrated cognitive aides. That alternative is
grounded in common-sense biology—the mind is limited by the brain.159 But a
plausible limiting principle is much harder to come by where the corporate mind
is concerned.160 Corporations have no brains of their own.161
The remainder of this part discusses how to integrate the extended mind
thesis into the law of corporate liability. Following two accounts of what the
154. See Clark & Chalmers, supra note 43, at 8.
155. John McCarthy et al., Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial
Intelligence 7 (Aug. 31, 1955) (unpublished manuscript), http://jmc.stanford.edu/
articles/dartmouth/dartmouth.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9L6-S8D7]. See generally A.M. Turing,
Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950) (discussing broadly whether machines can
think).
156. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”).
157. And perhaps some psychological projection on our part. See Diamantis, Corporate Criminal,
supra note 35, at 2077–80.
158. The various alternative approaches laws take to define the corporate mind reflect the
metaphysical arbitrariness of respondeat superior. See Crim. Code Act of 1995 (Cth) div 12.3(2)(c)
(Austl.) (setting out the corporate ethos approach); United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821
F.2d 844, 853, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (setting out the collective knowledge doctrine); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (explaining that a corporation can
be convicted based on decisions or actions of the board of directors or a high managerial agent acting
within the scope of their employment).
159. A sophisticated version of this challenge is the so-called “coupling-constitution fallacy.” See
FREDERICK ADAMS & KENNETH AIZAWA, THE BOUNDS OF COGNITION 76–105 (2010) (ebook).
160. For similar reasons, the objection to the extended mind thesis that people lack direct access
to information in extended systems, see generally John Preston, The Extended Mind, The Concept of Belief,
and Epistemic Credit, in THE EXTENDED MIND, supra note 109, at 355 (discussing access, authority, and
belief in the context of the extended mind theory), does not apply to corporations.
161. See United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir 1998) (“Corporations do
not record knowledge in neural pathways; they record it in file cabinets (and increasingly on computer
disks).”).
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proposed doctrine might look like, this part takes up policy considerations that
could call for pragmatic limits on how far the corporate mind extends.
A.

Doctrinal Proposal

Under what conditions does a corporation know information embedded in
algorithms or big data systems? According to centuries-old legal doctrine,
corporations know things stored in employee brains. Extended mind theory
offers a framework for reaching beyond that traditional perimeter to include
digitally stored information. As was the case when discussing human minds,
there are two approaches for evaluating particular cases: coming up with ad hoc
analogies and applying generalized criteria. Both approaches should produce
largely the same results, though one or the other may be more useful depending
on context.
1. The Analogical Approach
The previous part’s discussion of Alice and Barry illustrates the analogical
approach.162 Stated abstractly, the approach compares a person of interest, P1,
who bears a functional relationship to some information, I1, with a second
person, P2, who has a relevantly similar functional relationship to some similar
information, I2. If it is clear that P2 knows I2, then P1 must know I1.163 This is
the upshot of defining mental states in terms of their functional role—same
functional relationship, same mental state.
Carrying out the analogical approach for corporate people works slightly
differently from how it works for natural people. Where P1 is a natural person
(like Barry), the readiest comparator P2 with clear knowledge is someone who
(like Alice) had the information stored in her brain. However, where P1 is a
corporate person with digitally-stored I1, the analogical approach calls for a
different sort of P2 comparator. Under respondeat superior, the clear-cut case
of corporate knowledge is one where the information is stored in an employee
brain. So P2 should be a corporation that behaves similarly to P1, but where it is
clear that an employee knows I2. The success of the analogy turns on two factors:
(1) whether the functional relationships between P1 and I1 and P2 and I2 are
relevantly similar and (2) how obvious it is that P2 (i.e., an employee at P2)
knew I2.164
162. See supra Part III.
163. Some scholars discussing negligence have proposed different standards for employees and AI,
e.g., that the standards for negligence in AI should be twice as strict as those for human individuals.
See Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 1679 (reasoning that automated cars should be “at least twice as safe” as
man operated vehicles before being put on the road).
164. The analysis here presumes that we have a workable theory of when AI behavior is attributable
to corporations. So far as I know, we do not. There are several possibilities. Attribution might turn on
whether the corporation owns the relevant software. Or whether the corporation owns the hardware
running the software. Or whether the corporation subsequently endorsed the behavior. While I would
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The analogical approach could be easily adapted to the fact-finding process
at trial. Hypothetical and comparative reasoning are already essential features
of the adjudicative process.165 Indeed, other scholars have emphasized the
importance of comparative reasoning for evaluating corporate mental states.166
In such reasoning, the task for the plaintiff or prosecution is to construct the
comparison case. The task for the defense is to question their similarity. And
the task of the fact finder is to arbitrate the persuasiveness of the comparison.
It bears emphasizing that civil plaintiffs and criminal prosecutors using
the analogical approach would still need to satisfy their relevant burdens of
proof: preponderance of the evidence167 and beyond a reasonable doubt,168
respectively. It would not be enough for them simply to stipulate in comparison
corporation, P2, that an employee knew I2. That would just demonstrate that
there is some comparable P2 who knows I2. The strongest implication fact finders
could draw from such a case is the mere possibility that the corporate defendant,
P1, knew I1. Strategically, plaintiffs and prosecutors should instead present a P2
that had access to the relevant information, behaved similarly to P1, and did so
only using employees. Plaintiffs and prosecutors should not stipulate that one
of P2’s employees actually knew the information. To satisfy the burden of proof
for liability, the fact finders would have to infer that P2 (i.e., an employee within
P2) most likely knew (civil law) or must have known (criminal law) the relevant
information. That would show not just that there is some analogous P2 that knew
the information but that any analogous P2 probably did. The implication that
would follow is that P1 probably did too.
When laid out formally, this style of reasoning may seem complex, but it
is actually an intuitive process that judges and juries use all the time. It involves
evaluating the likelihood that some fact remains true in a hypothetical case with
facts similar to the actual case. In civil law, res ipsa loquitur arguments—i.e.,
that the sort of accident at issue does not ordinarily occur without
negligence169—have an identical logical structure. The plaintiff effectively
argues that in any relevantly similar case, the person who caused the accident

tentatively propose that the relevant variable should be the level of control the corporation exercises
over the AI, readers should proceed with their own preferred theory of corporate behavior.
165. See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389, 393 (1985) (using comparative
reasoning); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 925–26 (1996) (explaining that analogy is a frequently
used technique in legal arguments).
166. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 701, 704
(1994) [hereinafter Laufer, Corporate Bodies].
167. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (“In a typical suit for money
damages, plaintiffs must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
168. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (discussing the requisite level of proof in criminal
cases).
169. Res Ipsa Loquitur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61.
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most likely behaved negligently.170 Similar reasoning appears in corporate
criminal law. Corporate prosecutors can show that, given the circumstances of
the misconduct, some employee must have possessed culpable knowledge, even
if the prosecutor cannot show who.171 The structure of that argument requires
demonstrating that in any relevantly similar case, an employee must have
possessed culpable knowledge.
Consider how the analogical approach would play out in the HealthCo
hypothetical. To argue that HealthCo knew the forms were fake, the
prosecution would need to present a hypothetical comparison case with three
crucial features:
1.
2.
3.

The corporation behaved similarly (i.e., filed fake reimbursement
forms); and
the corporation did so using employees (i.e., rather than an
algorithm like FormBot);
who had access to (without stipulating that they knew) similar
information (i.e., the information that should have been on the
forms).

The strength of the prosecution’s argument would turn on the credibility of the
comparison case, the closeness of its functional similarity to the corporate
defendant, and how likely it is that some employee in the comparison case must
have known the information.
Like so much in the fact-finding process, the analysis in most cases will
not be clear-cut. More facts would be needed in the HealthCo hypothetical
before a resolution started to crystalize. It may turn out, for example, that the
misstatements on HealthCo’s forms were all relatively small. In the
hypothetical comparison cases where an employee filled out the forms, this
could be consistent with the employee making rounding errors rather than
filling out forms she knew to be false. However, it may also turn out that the
rounding errors always favored HealthCo. That programmatic behavior, carried
out by an employee, would be more consistent with knowing falsification.
2. Using Generalized Criteria
In some situations, it may be helpful to have generalized criteria for
evaluating whether a corporation knows information embedded in its
algorithms. The criteria would need to characterize the functional relationship
170. Another civil example comes from product liability, where factfinders can infer a product
defect from product performance that “was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY § 3(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
171. See Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1248 (1979) (citing United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F.
Supp. 730, 735 n.7, 739 (W.D. Va. 1974)).
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corporations bear to information that current law clearly treats them as
knowing. Respondeat superior defines what those situations are. If the criteria
accurately capture that functional relationship, functionalism dictates that any
corporation satisfying the criteria for some information would count as knowing
that information. This would be true regardless of how or where the
information was stored.
The basic requirement of respondeat superior is that some employee
knows the information.172 Since this first requirement ultimately concerns
knowledge of natural people (the employees), slightly modified versions of the
criteria extended mind theorists already offer for humans should work:
1.
2.
3.

The information is available and the employee/algorithm (on behalf
of the corporation) typically invokes it;
the employee/algorithm (on behalf of the corporation) more or less
automatically endorses the information upon retrieval; and
the employee/algorithm (on behalf of the corporation) can easily
access the information.

Collectively, these criteria intuitively capture the functional relationship a
corporation has with corporate information stored in its employees’ brains—the
employees have easy recall of that information and use it to perform their job.
By replacing “employee” with “algorithm,” the criteria easily adapt to answer
whether a corporation knows information through one of its algorithms. Most
corporate algorithms that have ready access to information they use to direct
corporate operations would satisfy the criteria.
Respondeat superior has two additional requirements for attributing
employee knowledge to corporations: first, that the employee knows the
information within the scope of her employment and, second, that she uses it
with an intent to benefit her employer.173 These two requirements, however,
have been so weakened by the courts that it is questionable whether the
generalized criteria developed here for knowledge need to account for them. An
employee effectively counts as working within the scope of her employment
whenever she is on the job, even if she is acting contrary to her employer’s
orders.174 And an employee counts as intending to benefit her employer even
when that intent is subsidiary,175 hypothetical,176 or ineffective.177

172. See supra Part I.
173. See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations §§ 1812, 1817, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2020).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972).
175. See United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
176. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d,
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
177. See Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945).
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The intuitive purpose of respondeat superior’s scope-of-employment and
intent-to-benefit requirements is to let corporations off the hook in two
scenarios: where an employee knows something only in her private capacity
(“My dad didn’t really have that surgery.”) or goes rogue and uses her
knowledge only to thwart corporate goals (“This is how I could embezzle
corporate assets.”). Since algorithms do not have private lives, the first scenario
is irrelevant. However, algorithms can advance or hinder corporate goals. A
broken algorithm can victimize a corporation as much as rogue employees can.178
The following fourth criterion should accommodate the interests behind
respondeat superior’s intent-to-benefit requirement:
4.

Furthermore, the algorithm must use the information in a way that
accrues some (perhaps illegitimate or minor) benefit to the
corporation.

Like the law’s current intent-to-benefit requirement, the overwhelming
majority of cases will easily satisfy this fourth criterion.
How would the criteria apply to HealthCo? HealthCo’s form filing
algorithm, FormBot, clearly satisfies the fourth criterion (benefit to the
corporation) since the falsified forms generated millions of dollars for
HealthCo. To evaluate the other criteria, more technical details about how
FormBot accesses and uses information would be needed. It is probably safe to
assume that FormBot satisfies the first (typically invokes the information) and
third (automatically endorses the information) criteria. There is no reason
HealthCo’s engineers would design FormBot with obstructed access to claims
information or so that Formbot would not typically invoke that information
when filing claims. With respect to the second criterion (automatic
endorsement of information), there is more wiggle room. The engineers might
have designed FormBot to accept and use the claims information it received
uncritically. This would strengthen the claim that FormBot satisfies the second
criterion and, consequently, that HealthCo knew the information.
Alternatively, HealthCo’s engineers might have designed FormBot to be more
skeptical, with built-in audit controls to verify and validate the information
before using it. In that case, FormBot would be less likely to satisfy the second
criterion, and HealthCo would be less likely to count as knowing the
information.

178. See Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d at 970 (noting that the employee intended to defraud his employer
rather than benefit him). When an algorithm improperly discriminates against loan or job applicants,
the company on whose behalf it is working loses out too because they miss out on profitable lending
opportunities or quality candidates. See Margareta Drzeniek-Hanouz, Why Discrimination Is Bad for
Business, WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/whydiscrimination-hurts-competitiveness/ [https://perma.cc/H7R9-BH6F].
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It is worth pausing briefly to note how the four criteria generate attractive
policy results. They serve as a workable and theoretically grounded basis for
bringing extended mind theory into corporate law. As such, they offer the
possibility of holding corporations like HealthCo liable when their algorithms
break the law. The criteria do not automatically impose liability every time a
corporate algorithm causes harm. They have a contingency that gives
corporations socially beneficial incentives. For example, from the ex ante
perspective, the criteria would have allowed HealthCo to reduce its prospect of
liability by building additional quality controls into FormBot. Incentivizing
responsible algorithm development is exactly what the law should be doing. It
is to this and other policy considerations that the Article now turns.
B.

Policy-Based Objections and Restrictions

Extending the corporate mind using either of the two approaches just
described would be a good first stab at solving the problem of algorithmic
corporate misconduct. Though the proposals are a sure improvement over
current law—which effectively shields corporations from liability for many
algorithmic harms—further refinements might advance corporate law’s goals
even better. The discussion that follows focuses on criminal justice policies;
related considerations arise in civil contexts too.
The foremost policy goals in corporate criminal law are familiar from
criminal law more broadly,179 namely retribution180 and deterrence.181
Retribution may initially seem an odd fit for corporate criminal law since
corporations are not ordinary moral agents.182 However, retributive sentiments
are a strong driver behind corporate criminal law.183 There are different versions
of retribution theory. The version that best fits corporate criminal law seeks to
use criminal liability to vindicate the public’s intuitions about when
corporations deserve moral condemnation.184 Even though corporations may
not be true moral agents, they occupy a space in our sociopsychology that makes
moral judgments about them natural and irresistible.185 Illustrative is the clarion
179. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 22 (2010) (listing policy
goals).
180. Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for
Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109, 110 (2010).
181. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1325 (2001).
182. Alschuler, Two Ways To Think, supra note 68, at 1392 (highlighting the peculiarity of
punishing a corporation or imaginary person as if they were a real individual); Baker, supra note 67, at
350.
183. See Baer, supra 58, at 621 (discussing retributivist sentiments in corporate criminal law).
184. See PAUL ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 176–88
(2013); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 352 (1996).
185. See Diamantis, Corporate Criminal, supra note 35, at 2077–80.
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call for justice against corporations that have pushed addictive opioids onto
desperate consumers186 or have destroyed delicate environmental habitats.187
The vigor of the call warns the criminal justice system not to turn a deaf ear.
According to deterrence theory, criminal liability should seek to prevent
corporate misconduct by raising the costs of violating the law.188 The law can do
this by using the threat of sanctions to induce corporations to run their
businesses more carefully. Ordinarily, this means corporations will implement
additional compliance programs for things like employee training and
monitoring.189 Where algorithms are concerned, taking care means designing
algorithms that are less likely to break the law. While nothing can guarantee
that a machine learning algorithm will always follow the law (nor can anything
guarantee employees will always follow the law either),190 software engineers
can take steps to reduce the probability that algorithms will misbehave.191 These
steps include: diversifying the body of engineers writing algorithms,192 more
careful initial programming,193 more mindful selection of training data sets,194

186. See, e.g., Maia Szalavitz, Big Pharma’s Opioid Greed Was Even Worse than We Thought, VICE
(Sept. 13, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xj97q/big-pharmas-opioid-greed-waseven-worse-than-we-thought [https://perma.cc/2ZKH-VSWL] (“Like the apocryphal child who
murdered his parents and then pleaded for sympathy because he’d become an orphan, Purdue first
profitably pushed an addictive drug, and then apparently sought to make even more money by treating
addictions it helped cause.”).
187. See, e.g., George Monbiot, Shell Is Not a Green Savior. It’s a Planetary Death Machine,
GUARDIAN (June 26, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/26/shell-notgreen-saviour-death-machine-greenwash-oil-gas [https://perma.cc/JP2Y-XPHT] (“Trumpeting its
investment in natural ecosystems looks to me like a means of sustaining its social licence [sic] to extract
the gas and oil that will destroy our lives.”).
188. See Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, The Demise of Rehabilitation: Sentencing Reform and
the Sanctioning of Organizational Criminality, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 367 (1986).
189. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1204–06 (1983).
190. See Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal Liability and
Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 112 (2014).
191. See generally William D. Smart, Cindy M. Grimm & Woodrow Hartzog, An Education Theory
of Fault for Autonomous Systems, 2017 PROC. WEROBOT 24–27, http://people.oregonstate.edu/
~smartw/library/papers/2017/werobot2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EPL-WART]. For a detailed
treatment on how bias can arise in algorithms, see Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Artez, Learning
Algorithms and Discrimination, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 88 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (ebook).
192. See Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guyproblem.html [https://perma.cc/FS5W-R5HL (dark archive)].
193. See Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 1634–36 (discussing algorithm errors caused by programming
bugs).
194. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 29, at 680–81; Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Engaging in Rational
Discrimination: Exploring Reasons for Placing Regulatory Constraints on Decision Support Systems, 12 ETHICS
& INFO. TECH. 29, 31 (2010) (discussing how bad data can bias automated systems).

98 N.C. L. REV. 893 (2020)

2020]

EXTENDED CORPORATE MIND

925

more extensive pre-roll-out testing,195 regular post-roll-out quality audits,196
routine run-time compliance layers,197 effective monitoring,198 and continuous
software updates to address problems as they arise.199 Programmers also have
tools they can use to prove (to themselves or to others) that an algorithm has
been applying its rules consistently.200 Each of these precautions entail costs
that, all things considered, corporations would rather avoid. Through the threat
of sanction, criminal liability can make taking precaution cheaper than risking
violation.
Since the focus of this Article has been to expand the scope of corporate
liability, the most pressing policy concern is whether the proposals go too far.
For example, the approach offered here does not require any sort of wrongdoing
on the part of the corporation aside from the algorithmic misconduct itself. That
may seem like a retributively inappropriate form of vicarious liability201: How
can a corporation deserve punishment if it has done nothing wrong?202

195. See Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 1623, 1651–54; see also DAVE CLIFF & LINDA NORTHOP,
GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN ULTRA-LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS
PERSPECTIVE 19–20 (2012) (discussing the need for testing trading algorithms using simulations).
196. See B. Bodo et al., Tackling Algorithmic Control Crisis—The Technical, Legal, and Ethical
Challenges of Research into Algorithmic Agents, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 133, 142–44 (2017) (describing
audits of algorithms); James Guszcza et al., Why We Need To Audit Algorithms, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.
28, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/11/why-we-need-to-audit-algorithms. See generally Shlomit YaniskyRavid & Sean K. Hallisey, Equality and Privacy by Design: A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data
Transparency Via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 434–35
(2019) (advocating for a system of auditing and certification of data and artificial intelligence in order
to encourage transparency).
197. See Louise Dennis et al., Formal Verification of Ethical Choices in Autonomous Systems, 77
ROBOTICS & AUTONOMOUS SYSS. 1, 1–2 (2016) (discussing formal verification); Felippe Meneguzzi
& Michael Luck, Norm-Based Behaviuor Modification in BDI Agents, 2009 PROC. 8TH INT’L JOINT
CONF. ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTI-AGENT SYSS. 177, 177.
198. King et al., supra note 81, at 110–12 (discussing four possible monitoring mechanisms for
algorithms).
199. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED
VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 16 (2016),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=795644
[https://perma.cc/6BWR-YTTR]
(envisioning
manufacturers of self-driving cars will update software regularly to improve safety).
200. Kroll et al., supra note 117, at 662–72 (describing available mechanisms). Without these
mechanisms, verification after the fact can be difficult for a host of technical and legal reasons. See
generally Amanda Lewindowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem,
93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 589–90 (2018) (examining whether the fair use doctrine can allow AI creators
to avoid inconsistencies caused by copyright law).
201. The Association for Computing Machinery has proposed something analogous for
individuals, namely that they be held accountable for the decisions made by the algorithms they use.
ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACH., U.S. PUB. POLICY COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2017), https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/
public-policy/2017_usacm_statement_algorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/YVT6-5GSK].
202. See Lemley & Casey, supra note 17, at 1313–15 (considering a similar question).
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1. Vicarious Liability for Wayward Algorithms
This challenge is not unique to extended mind theory and algorithmic
misconduct. All corporate liability, including criminal liability under current
law, seems to be vicarious. Corporations cannot act on their own;203 they must
act through the employees and (now) algorithms that run them. Respondeat
superior assigns fault from employees to corporations, and it does so without
requiring any additional fault, like negligent hiring practices or ex-post
ratification of the misconduct, on the part of the corporation.204 The doctrines
proposed above would be no different. So far as the accusation of retributive
unfairness is concerned, the response on behalf of respondeat superior and
extended mind theory is the same: the challenge relies on a conceptual mistake.
The response assumes that there is a gap between the corporation doing
something wrong and its employees or algorithms doing something wrong.
However, employees and algorithms are parts of corporations.205 So employee
and algorithmic wrongs are corporate wrongs. The liability is not really
vicarious after all.206
There is also a deterrence-based rationale that animates respondeat
superior and extended corporate mind theory. Even though corporations can
never guarantee that their employees will behave on the job,207 corporations are
in the best position to mitigate the risks of misbehavior.208 By threatening to
punish a corporation whenever one of its employees does something wrong,
respondeat superior incentivizes corporations to implement compliance
protocols such as209 additional screening at hiring, better employee training,
more effective employee monitoring, more open reporting channels, and
stricter disciplinary responses.210 The same is true of holding corporations
responsible for algorithmic misconduct. By holding corporations responsible for
203. Laufer, Corporate Bodies, supra note 166, at 652 (“A corporation can only act through an agent
. . . .”).
204. Some theorists proposed that these sorts of corporate deficiencies could form an alternate
framework for establishing corporate fault. See, e.g., Fisse, supra note 189, at 1200 (discussing both
reactive and proactive fault).
205. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909) (noting
that a corporation is made up of its officers and agents).
206. See Am. Med. Assoc. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“When a
corporation is guilty of a crime it is because of a corporate act, a corporate intent . . . . The fact that a
corporation can act only by human agents is immaterial.”), aff’d, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
207. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership,
Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 6 (1999) (“[T]he occurrence of crime
realistically depends on a variety of influences beyond management’s control.”); Schwartz, supra note
190, at 112.
208. Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV.
321, 332–33 (2012) (“[C]orporations often are the lowest-cost providers of many forms of policing.”).
209. See id. at 332–34.
210. See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New
Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466–67 (2008).
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the algorithms they use, the law can incentivize corporations to do a better job
designing, monitoring, and correcting their algorithms.
One might worry that the same reasoning will not work if, as is often the
case, a corporation hires a more experienced technology firm to design its
algorithms.211 In that case, the most direct way to prevent crime might be to
target the incentives of the technology firm. However, holding corporate end
users liable can accomplish the same result. Corporations will undoubtedly pass
the costs of algorithmic misconduct onto technology firms through
indemnification agreements, thereby forcing the technology firms to internalize
the risk of misconduct.212 If they bear the financial risk when their algorithms
misbehave, technology firms will take more efficient precautions in designing
and testing their products. It is administratively easier to hold corporate end
users liable rather than going to the technology firms directly. That removes
the courts from the messy business213 of apportioning liability between
technology firms (for design error)214 and corporate end users (for user error).215
2. Vicarious Liability for Others’ Information
There is another respect in which extended mind theory could lead to what
may seem like an overbroad expansion of corporate liability. Recall that under
extended mind theory if a person bears the right functional relationship to some
information, she counts as knowing it, regardless of where or how the
information is stored. In a digitally connected world, this could end up being
very inclusive. Consider what that means for natural people. Barry is counted
as knowing the information in his diary because he could easily use it to find
211. See Lemley & Casey, supra note 17, at 1352 (“Robots are composed of many complex
components . . . often designed, operated, leased, or owned by different companies.”).
212. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1146 (1991) (“[M]ost corporations use at least one form of compensation,
indemnification, in a way that encourages corporate crime . . . .”); David R. Cohen & Roberta D.
Anderson, Insurance Coverage for “Cyber-Losses,” 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 891, 926 (2000) (“Directors’ and
officers’ [(“D&O”)] insurance policies afford coverage for the defense and indemnification costs of
directors and officers sued in connection with discharge of their corporate duties. A typical D&O policy
insures against any ‘loss’ arising out of a ‘wrongful act.’”).
213. See Lemley & Casey, supra note 17, at 1352–53 (“Robot designers, owners, operators, and users
will, of course, fight over who bears true legal responsibility for causing the robot to behave the way it
did. And these complex distinctions don’t even account for the role of third parties causing robots to
behave in adverse ways . . . .”).
214. Assuming the mistake on the design side, it may still be difficult to locate where. See David
C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117,
125 (2014) (discussing the difficulties in determining who is responsible for AI errors).
215. See MATILDA CLAUSSÉN-KARLSSON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE EXTERNAL
ELEMENT OF THE CRIME 22 (2017), http://oru.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1115160/
FULLTEXT01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F29-WQNR] (discussing involvement of both users and
producers of AI); McAllister, supra note 123, at 2550.

98 N.C. L. REV. 893 (2020)

928

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

the café. But what if, instead of writing the directions in his diary, Barry looked
them up on his cellphone after he set off. Assuming Barry still bore the right
functional relationship to the information, he would count as knowing it. Since
he always had easy access to the information through his phone (he could have
looked it up any time), he should count as having known it even before he pulled
the phone out of his pocket. The fact that the data was actually stored on a
server farm hundreds of miles away would not affect the analysis. What is true
of the directional information could equally be true of any other information
accessible through Barry’s data connection. For example, Barry, cell phone in
hand, may also count as knowing everything on Wikipedia, even articles he has
yet to read. That can lead to some very weird results, e.g., that what Barry
knows is constantly being altered without his awareness as Wikipedia editors
add, delete, and change content.
Even for many extended mind enthusiasts, this seems a step too far.216 To
constrain the extended mind thesis, some theorists propose an additional
criterion for evaluating whether a subject counts as knowing external
information: the subject must have previously endorsed the information.217 This
would effectively restrict the scope of information a subject can know to
information that had previously been routed through him (i.e., through his
brain). With this new restriction, Barry would still count as knowing the
directions in his diary since he read them on his computer and then wrote them
himself. But he would no longer count as knowing everything on Wikipedia,
because he had never previously been cognizant of most of it.
Some similarly restrictive criterion may be appropriate in the corporate
context. In the course of fulfilling their duties, corporate employees often use
proprietary databases owned, maintained, and operated by third parties.218 The
same is true of corporate algorithms.219 Loan approval platforms, for example,
automatically draw on databases that credit rating agencies maintain.220 If
information on third-party databases is sufficiently integrated into a
corporation’s algorithmic decisionmaking, the corporation could qualify as
knowing it. And what the corporation knows would be in a constant state of
flux as the third party maintaining the database changes its content. Such a
result could be worrying from a criminal justice perspective. Since corporations
cannot directly control the information on third-party servers, holding
216. See Clark & Chalmers, supra note 43, at 17.
217. See id.
218. See Pittman, supra note 9, at 768–79; see also Hillary Hellmann, Acknowledging the Threat:
Securing United States Pipeline SCADA Systems, 36 ENERGY L.J. 157, 161 (2015).
219. See Pittman, supra note 9, at 767–69 (discussing third party resources generally).
220. See, e.g., Comprehensive Credit Decisioning Software, ACTICO, https://www.actico.com/
solutions/loan-origination-decisioning/credit-decision-platform/
[https://perma.cc/Y47T-D2QP]
(“The Credit Bureau Gateway provides seamless integration with external data providers, such as credit
bureaus.”).
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corporations to account for it could seem unfair. Risk averse corporations might
refrain from giving their algorithms access to third-party information, even
when access would otherwise be cost-effective.
Assuming it would be desirable to restrict the scope of the extended
corporate mind, a variety of limiting principles are available. One very
restrictive condition would require that information housed in a data system, or
facts from which the information is inferable, must have been placed there by
an employee who previously endorsed that information. This directly parallels
the restriction proposed by extended mind theorists for natural people,221
effectively amounting to a requirement that the corporation would qualify
under respondeat superior as once having known the information. A range of
weaker conditions could turn on the degree of control corporate employees have
over the information, requiring anything from aggressive continuous
monitoring to occasional quality control sampling. A further question would be
whether the corporation must actually exercise that control or whether it is
enough that the corporation merely had the power (legal, practical, or
otherwise) to do so.
There may, however, be good reason to forego any additional restricting
conditions on corporate knowledge. The intuitions that drive the search for a
limit in the individual context are weaker when it comes to corporations. There
is an intuitive understanding of what it means for a human subject to
“previously endorse” information. Human subjects are spatiotemporally
constrained biological units. The question posed by the extended mind thesis is
whether their cognition might not extend beyond their spatiotemporal
constraints. Corporations, however, are by their nature spatiotemporally
distributed subjects. There is no equivalent of the corporate cranium to point
to. Since there is no strong intuition against extending the corporate mind to
remote data systems managed by other entities, the retributive case for a
limiting condition is weak.
There may also be a strong deterrence-based argument for rejecting a
limiting condition. One animating worry behind this Article is that, under
current law, corporations can insulate themselves from liability by offloading
operations from employees to algorithms. But a version of this worry might
rearise if corporations can exploit a limiting condition by offloading operations
from some algorithms and databases to others. Suppose, for example, a limiting
condition required some kind of employee monitoring of information, like
random quality control audits. A corporation could manage its liabilities by
offloading the information to remote databases maintained by another entity.
Furthermore, it may be most efficient in many circumstances to hold
corporations to account for all information they routinely access and use. This
221. See Clark & Chalmers, supra note 43, at 17.
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would give corporations incentives to maintain quality controls and to pressure
third-party information custodians to do the same.222 “[T]he safest way to secure
care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall be
taken.”223 Of course, allocating risk brings transaction costs and other potential
barriers to business relations, all of which dampen innovation and economic
progress. It is an open empirical question whether something like the fourth
requirement would ultimately help or hurt in the corporate context. At least
where the potential social stakes are high—as they often are with knowledgebased civil and criminal violations—perhaps the law should require corporations
to be exacting about the quality of their information, regardless of where it
comes from.
CONCLUSION
Automation is the future for many corporations. That future will make
corporations faster and cheaper, but it will not eliminate corporate harm. The
law, as it presently stands, will soon find itself without any tools to address
broad swathes of corporate misconduct. Most corporate liability requires
corporate mental states—like knowledge of falsity or intent to defraud—which
the law presently defines in terms of employee mental states. But when
algorithms run the corporate show, employee mental states, and hence corporate
liability, are out of the picture. This Article proposes a solution that leverages
the current framework for corporate liability. Drawing on themes from
contemporary philosophy and cognitive science, it shows that minds are not
limited by traditionally presumed boundaries. A range of external cognitive aids
fulfill brain-like roles for human beings. According to the extended mind thesis,
these aids form part of human minds. Similarly, a range of algorithmic aids are
coming to fulfill employee-like roles for corporations. Correspondingly, this
Article offers discrete legal reforms for recognizing that corporate minds can
extend to these too. The basic idea is that corporations that use algorithms to
fulfill employee roles should be treated as having the same mental states that
corporations using employees to fulfill those roles would have. This reform
would prevent opportunistic corporations from limiting their liability risk by
offloading operations from employees to algorithms.
It should now be clear that the proposal satisfies this Article’s minimalist
ambition—very little about current law would need to change. The proposal
draws heavily on corporate law’s current liability framework. Indeed, the law’s
fiction of corporate personhood is a crucial motivation for adapting extended

222. The rationale here parallels the case for holding manufacturers of self-driving cars liable for
injuries caused by third-party hackers. See Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 1690.
223. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 117 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923)
(1881).
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mind theory from natural people to the corporate context. The move only works
on the fictionalizing assumption that corporations are people with minds like
ours. As importantly, this Article nowhere assumed, as the law does not, that
algorithms have minds or can be responsible. Under the extended mind thesis,
the hypothesis is not that the external cognitive aids have their own
independent mental states.224 Barry’s diary did not know how to get to the café,
even if Barry (with the directions written in his diary) did. Analogously, the
claim here is that algorithms can form part of the corporate mind, not that they
have minds of their own. Corporations can be directly liable for the things they
decide and do, even when they use AI to make those decisions and take those
actions.

224. Andy Clark, Coupling, Constitution, and the Cognitive Kind, in THE EXTENDED MIND, supra
note 109, at 81, 83.
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